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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES TURCSANSKI,
Petitioner/Applicant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
and BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

Case No. 920716-CA
Priority No. 7

Respondent/Defendant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal from a
final order of the Industrial Commission pursuant to Sections 351-86, 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Is there substantial evidence to support the Industrial

Commission's finding that Petitioner Turcsanski failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating medical causation between an accident
on February 13, 1988 and his back and neck problems?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission abuse its discretion by

deciding not to refer the medical aspects of the case to a
medical panel?
3.

Since Petitioner has not raised, as an issue on appeal,

either in his docketing statement or initial appellate brief, the
Commission's ruling that his claim was barred by the one year

statute of limitations,1 is this appeal moot?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because these proceedings commenced after January 1, 1988,
the review by this Court is governed by the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA").2
A.

Standard for Reviewing the Commission's Finding

Regarding Medical Causation.
Petitioner argues that the Commission erred in ruling that
he failed to meet his burden of showing medical causation.3
This Court has consistently held that "medical causation is a
factual matter".4

Under the UAPA, findings of fact will be

affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.5
Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.6

"Petitioner

necessarily has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence
supporting the findings and showing that despite the supporting
facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence,

1

R.

2

at 112 A-Y. Petitioner's Brief at 1.

§§63-46b-l et. seq. of the Utah Code Ann.

Petitioner's Brief at 1.
4

Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992);
Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) .
5

King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34
(Utah App. 1993); Stewart v. Board of Review, supra at 137; §6346b-14(4)(g) of the Utah Code Ann.
6

King v. Industrial Commission, supra at 34.
2

the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."7
B.

Standard for Reviewing the Commission's Discretionary

Decision Not to Refer the Medical Aspects of the Case to a
Medical Panel.
Petitioner claims that the Commission erred in not referring
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by
the Commission.

Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated

provides that " . . . the Commission may refer the medical aspects
of the case to a medical panel . . .f|8
The Commission, therefore, is expressly granted the
discretion not to refer a case to a medical panel. Where a grant
of discretion to an agency exists, this Court " . . . will not
disturb the agency's interpretation or application of the law,
unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality."9
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
This case does not involve the interpretation of a statute,
ordinance, rule or regulation.

Rather, the issues presented on

appeal pertain to the Commission's factual finding of no medical
causation and the exercise of its discretion granted to it under

7

Id.

8

§35-l-77 of the Utah Code Ann. (1992), emphasis added.

9

King v. Industrial Commission, supra at 35. In Champion
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court applied an "abuse of discretion" standard
to the Commission's decision not to refer a case to a medical
panel.
3

Utah law.
The following statutes and rules are, however, controlling
in his case:
1.

Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Code Annotated.10

2.

Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated.11

3.

Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Code Annotated.12

4.

Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated (1988).13

5.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.14

6.

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.15
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 13, 1988, Petitioner, while employed by the
City, was on a ladder ten to twelve feet from the floor when the
ladder slipped.16

He fell, with the ladder beneath him, and

landed on his back, however, the fall was cushioned because he
"rode the ladder down" and broke the fall with his hands.17
When he put his hands down to break his fall, he sustained a
contusion to his right forearm.

He was treated for injuries to

his right forearm at the Holy Cross Hospital Emergency Room and
10

Appendix "A" attached.

xl

Appendix "B" attached.

12

Appendix "C" attached.

"Appendix "D" attached.
14

Appendix "E" attached.

"Appendix "F" attached.
16

R. at 57, R. at 99.

17

R. at 57.

returned to work the same day.18

He did not miss any time from

work due to his accident.19
In a Report of Injury, dated February 13, 1988, Petitioner
notified the City of the accident and injuries to his right arm
and knee.20
or neck.21

The report did not mention any injuries to his back
In 1988, the City paid all of Petitioner's medical

expenses related to his right arm and knee.22
Four years after the accident, Petitioner notified the City,
for the first time, that he had back and neck problems which he
claimed were attributable to the February 13, 1988 accident.23
On July 20, 1992, an evidentiary hearing was held before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine if Petitioner's back
and neck problems were compensable under the Workers'
Compensation laws.

Based upon the evidence presented at the

hearing, including all relevant medical records and the testimony
of Dr. Cory Anden,24 the ALJ ruled that:
1.

Petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of

limitations for failing to notify the City of his back injury
within one year after the accident;
18

Id.

19

Id.

20

R. at 60.

21

Id.

22

R. at 101.

23

R. at 101, R. at 58.

24

R. at 59.
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2.

Petitioner did not meet his burden of proving medical

causation between the accident and his back and neck problems;25
and
3.

There was no medical issue to justify the use of a

medical panel.26
On Petitioner's Motion for Review, the Commission affirmed
the ALJ's decision.27
Petitioner filed an appeal with this Court seeking review of
only

" . . . that portion of the Order which held that applicant

failed to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence."28
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is a statement of the undisputed facts
relevant to the Commission's decision:
1.

On February 13, 1988, while employed by the City,

Petitioner was cleaning the ceiling of a pump house on a ladder
approximately 10 to 12 feet off the floor.29
2-

The ladder Petitioner was on slipped and, with the

ladder underneath him, he "rode the ladder" down which cushioned
his fall, and landed on his back.30
3.

During the fall, Petitioner put his hands down to

25

R. at 60, 61.

26

R. at 61.

27

R. at 98-103.

28

R. at 112.

29

R. at 57.

30

Id.
6

further break his fall and sustained a contusion on his right
forearm from a protruding valve.31
4.

After the fall, Petitioner felt pain in his right arm

and leg.32
5.

At the time of the accident, Petitioner did not feel

any pain in his back or neck.33
6.

Within hours following the accident, Petitioner went to

the Emergency Room at Holy Cross Hospital and was examined by Dr.
James Antinori.34
7.

At no time during the examination on February 13, 1988

did Petitioner complain of back or neck problems to Dr.
Antinori.35
8.

As a result of the examination on February 13, 1988,

Dr. Antinori found injuries only to Petitioner's right
forearm.36
9.

After the examination by Dr. Antinori, Petitioner

returned to work the same day of the accident and completed his
shift.37
10.

Petitioner did not miss any time from work due to the

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

R. at 57, R. at 129.

35

R. at 129.

36

R. at 128.

37

R. at 57.
7

accident .38
11.

On February 13, 1988, the date of the accident,

Petitioner signed and filed a report with the City which stated
that he ". . . landed on a pump injuring [his] knee and arm."39
12.

The report filed by Petitioner on February 13, 1988 did

not mention any injuries to his back or neck.40
13.

The City paid all of Petitioner's medical expenses

submitted by him for care to his right arm and knee.41
14.

On June 22, 1988, the City notified Petitioner, in

writing, that his workers' compensation file pertaining to the
February 13, 1988 accident was closed and that the City had paid
all medical bills related to the claim.42
15.

On March 17, 1988, one month after the accident,

Petitioner sought medical treatment from Dr. Stephen Barlow.43
16.

During his medical visit with Dr. Stephen Barlow,

Petitioner made no reference to any back or neck problems.44
17.

On June 22, 1988, four months after the accident,

Petitioner sought medical care from Dr. Stephen Barlow indicating
38

Id.

39

R. at 6, R. at 60.

40

R. at 6.

41

R. at 122, R. at 60.

42

R. at 123.

43

R. at 135. R. at 57. The ALJ indicated that Petitioner
saw Dr. King Udall on said date. The Commission, on review,
corrected the name to Dr. Stephen Barlow. R. at 102.
44

R. at 135.
8

that he had some back discomfort, however, he never mentioned the
accident on February 13, 1988. On examination, Dr. Barlow found
no back injury and diagnosed prostatis.45
18.

More than a year after the accident, Petitioner saw Dr.

King Udall for several problems including neck discomfort and
depression.

Dr. Udall characterized the depression as being of

"greater concern" and prescribed Prozac.46
19.

After a November 20, 1989 visit by Petitioner, Dr.

Udall ordered a cervical x-ray on his back.

The x-ray report

indicates "marked degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc
. "47

20.

Following a December 26, 1989 visit by Petitioner,

Dr. Udall noted that "Mr. Turcsanski has had acute pain in the
mid-back, mainly on the left side.

He had had this kind of

problem in the past, usually with acute infection.
somewhat better."
21.

Dr. Udall prescribed muscle relaxants.48

On May 28, 1991, Dr. Udall met with Petitioner and

noted "Jim again has severe low back pain.
about sexual dysfunction."
22.

He is still concerned

Dr. Udall prescribed Anaprox.49

On December 3, 1991, Dr. Udall met with Petitioner and

45

R. at 136. R. at 57.

46

R. at 57.

47

His neck is

Id.

48

R. at 58.

49

Id.
9

noted "no acute problems."50
23.

From 1989 through 1992, Petitioner sought medical care

from Dr. King Udall for other different problems including
bronchitis, sinus conditions, cholesterol and depression.51
24.

At no time, prior to December 1991, did Petitioner

mention to Dr. King Udall, during the many visits he had with
Dr. Udall, the accident of February 13, 1988.52
25.

In December 1991, Petitioner understood that he was

unable to get health insurance coverage for his 1991 back
problems because they were excluded under a pre-existing
condition provision.53
26.

In December 1991, Petitioner contacted the City

requesting workers' compensation coverage for his back and neck
problems which he claimed were sustained in the accident on
February 13, 1988.54

His request to the City in December 1991

was the first time he notified the City of his back and neck
problems and that he attributed these problems to an accident on
February 13, 1988.55
27.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

R.

The City denied Petitioner's workers' compensation

at

60.
10

claim in December 1991.56
28.

Based on a referral of Dr. James Antinori, Petitioner

was evaluated by Dr. Cory Anden on December 9, 1991.57
29.

Dr. Anden stated, in her notes from the visit on

December 9, 1991, that Petitioner reported developing neck pain
and tenderness in about 1990. She further indicated that he had
been evaluated by Dr. Udall and diagnosed with degenerative
changes .58
30.

On December 23, 1991, Dr. Anden met with Petitioner and

evaluated x-rays that were taken on his back.59
31.

On December 23, 1991, Dr. Anden7s report stated that

there were "post traumatic changes of the L5 vertebral body with
disc space narrowing at L4-5 most likely sustained in the
industrial fall in 1988; possible left L3-4 radiculopathy
secondary to disc herniation; [and] left gluteus medius muscular
strain. "60
32.

On July 7, 1992, based on a review of the February 13,

1988 emergency room medical records, Dr. Anden issued an opinion
correcting her prior remark of December 23, 1991 stating:
I feel that this was an incorrect statement on my part,
in that, if a traumatic vertebral compression fracture
had been sustained in the fall, he would have had
56

R. at 58.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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complaints of back pain at the time, not over one year
later. A more correct statement would have been that
it is possible that the lumbar injury was sustained in
the fall, although it could have been related to any
prior or subsequent traumatic injury, as no other
lumbar x-rays had been obtained to determine the age of
abnormality.61
33.

In her July 7, 1992 opinion, Dr. Anden concluded:

. . . [I]n more complete review of the records and Mr.
Turcsanski's complaints of low back pain, I cannot
state with any degree of medical certainty that the
lumbar injury was sustained at the time of the workrelated fall of 2-13-88. In fact, it is unlikely that
the lumbar vertebral compression fracture at L5 was
sustained in the fall.62
34.

Dr. Roger Stuart performed a medical file review

relating to Petitioner's back and neck problems.63

On July 9,

1992, Dr. Stuart issued an opinion concluding that:
[Petitioner's] . . . history and x-rays are very
typical of the gradual and at times progressive nature
of degenerative spinal changes related to age, genetic
predisposition and activities. There is no documented
cervical or lumbar pain at or near the time of his
February 13, 1988 fall. Thus there is no evidence to
support the assertion that the fall played a pivotal or
major role in developing the diffuse degenerative
changes on Mr. Turcsanski's x-rays or in his current
back pain problem.64
35.

At the evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) on July 20, 1992, Dr. Cory Anden testified that the
absence of contemporaneous back pain was critical to her written
opinion of July 7, 1992. She testified that she would have

61

R. at 59.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

Emphasis added.
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expected Petitioner's back to be "acutely painful" for 4 to 6
weeks after the fall if, in fact, a compression fracture had
occurred.65
36.

On August 24, 1992, the ALJ ruled that:
a.

Petitioner's claim fails due to the application of

the statute of limitations.

The notice of a back injury was

not given to employer until four years after the
accident.66
b.

Beyond the statute of limitations, Petitioner has

failed to sustain his burden of proving medical causation in
relation to the treatment of his back.

Medical causation is

lacking due to (1) the absence of back pain at the time of
the 1988 fall, (2) the absence of missed work at the time of
the fall or thereafter, (3) the multi-year long delay in
Petitioner's attribution of the back pain to the fall, (4)
Petitioner's inconsistent reports of back pain to health
care providers while readily seeking treatment for other
conditions, (5) the inability of his physicians to state a
causal relationship between the 1988 fall and the back pain,
(6) the documented presence of degenerative disc disease as
an alternative cause of his pain, and (7) the suggestion
that one of Petitioner's motives in making this claim was to
obtain coverage through workers' compensation insurance
several years later because it was being denied him through
65

Id.

66

R. at 60.
13

his private health insurance.67
c.

Since the records do not identify any medical or

factual link between the fall and back pain, and because
none of the doctors will go beyond the realm of
"possibility", there is no significant medical issue to
justify use of a medical panel.68
37.

The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision on September

29, 1992.69
38.

On October 29, 1992, Petitioner filed a Writ of Review

requesting this Court to review " . . . that portion of the
[Commission's] Order which held that [Petitioner] . . . failed to
prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence".70
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Commission's decision for the
following reasons:
1.

Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in support of

the Commission's findings and shown that despite the supporting
facts, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
The evidence is more than substantial to support the Commission's
decision that Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing
medical causation.
67

R. at 60-61.

68

R. at 61. A copy of the ALJ's "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order" is attached as Appendix "G".
69

R. at 98. A copy of the Commission's "Denial of Motion
for Review" is attached as Appendix "H".
70

R. at 112.
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2.

The Commission's discretionary decision not to refer

the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel was within the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.

According to Utah law,

the Commission's decision not to refer the medical aspects of a
case to a medical panel is "discretionary".

Based on the facts

before it, the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that there were no significant issues for a medical
panel.
3.

Petitioner did not appeal the Commission's decision

that the statute of limitations bars his claim pursuant to
Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated (1988) . Accordingly,
without more, the Commission's decision denying Petitioner
workers' compensation benefits for his back and neck problems
must be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED
TO DEMONSTRATE MEDICAL CAUSATION BETWEEN AN
ACCIDENT ON FEBRUARY 13, 1988 AND HIS BACK
AND NECK PROBLEMS.
A.

Medical causation is a factual matter.

Petitioner argues that the Commission erred in finding that
he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating medical causation
between an accident on February 13, 1988 and his back and neck
problems.71
This Court has consistently held that "medical causation is
71

Petitioner's Brief at 1 and 5.
15

a factual matter."72

Petitioner, however, attempts, without

citing any authority, to transform medical causation from an
issue of fact to one of law, which would necessitate a different
standard of review.73
In Stewart v. Board of Review,74 a worker claimed, as does
the Petitioner in this case, that the Commission erred when it
found insufficient credible evidence to support a conclusion that
an accident caused her injuries.75

This Court analyzed the

issue raised by the worker in Stewart as a factual matter.76
This Court, in Stewart, accepted the ALJ's findings as conclusive
because the worker did not marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that those findings were
unsupported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the proper

standard of review regarding medical causation is whether the
Commission's finding is supported by substantial evidence.
B.

The Commission's finding regarding the absence of

medical causation is supported by substantial evidence.
"Substantial evidence" is that which a reasonable person "might

72

Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1992);
Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447 (Utah App. 1991) .
73

Petitioner's Brief at 5. There is nothing in the record
to indicate that the Commission required a burden of proof other
than a preponderance of the evidence.
74

Stewart v. Board of Review, supra.

75

Id.

76

Id.
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accept as adequate to support a conclusion."77

There is more

than adequate evidence to support the Commission's finding that
Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating medical
causation between the accident on February 13, 1988 and his back
and neck problems.
Immediately after the accident, Petitioner felt no pain in
his back or neck.78

Within hours after the accident, Petitioner

was examined by Dr. James Antinori at the Emergency Room of the
Holy Cross Hospital.79

During the examination, Petitioner never

complained to Dr. Antinori of back or neck pain.80

Dr. Antinori

noted in his records that the only injuries sustained by
Petitioner were contusions to his right forearm.81

After the

examination by Dr. Antinori, Petitioner returned to work the same
day and completed his shift.82

Petitioner did not miss any time

from work due to the accident.83

On the date of the accident,

Petitioner signed and filed a report with the City which stated
that he ". . . landed on a pump injuring [his] knee and arm.84

77

Kincr v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 34.

78

Fact 15.

79

Fact %6.

80

Fact 1|7.

81

Fact 1|8.

82

Fact f9.

83

Fact HlO.

84

Fact 111.
17

Petitioner never mentioned back or neck problems in the
report.85

In 1988, the City paid all medical expenses relating

to Petitioner's arm and knee.86
One month after the accident, Petitioner met with Dr.
Stephen Barlow for a regular medical visit and never mentioned
the accident of February 13, 1988.

Four months after the

accident, Petitioner sought further medical care from Dr. Barlow
and mentioned some back discomfort.87

Dr. Barlow examined the

Petitioner and found that there was no back injury.88
From 1989 to December 1991, Petitioner visited his family
physician, Dr. King Udall, for several problems including
depression and some neck and back discomfort.89

On examination

of Petitioner's back, Dr. Udall noted that x-rays showed marked
"degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc,lf90 or low back
pain associated with "acute infection".91

Significantly,

Petitioner never mentioned the February 13, 1988 accident to Dr.
King Udall in any of his visits prior to December 1991.92
In December 1991, approximately four years after the
85

Fact 112.

86

Fact Hl3.

87

Fact fl5.

88

Fact 117.

"Fact 118.
90

Fact 119.

91

Fact 1(20.

92

Fact 124.
18

accident, Petitioner contacted the City claiming that his back
and neck problems should be covered by workers' compensation
because they resulted from the accident on February 13, 1988.93
This was the first time the City was notified of Petitioner's
back and neck problems.94

Coincidentally, at the time

Petitioner notified the City, it was his understanding that, as a
result of a change in his health insurance, he would not be
covered for his back and neck problems because of a pre-existing
condition provision.95
In December 1991, as a result of a referral by Dr. James
Antinori, Dr. Cory Anden, a physiatrist, issued a letter, based
on information given to her by the Petitioner, stating that
Petitioner may have a small focal compression and mild narrowing
of the L4-5 disc space as well as a mild interior steophyte
formation at the L4 vertebral body.96
Initially, Dr. Anden indicated that, "it is probable that
the lumbar injury seen on the x-ray was sustained in this
fall."97

However, on July 7, 1992, after reviewing the

emergency room records prepared on the date of the accident and
learning that Petitioner experienced no pain in his back
contemporaneously with the accident or months later, Dr. Anden
93

Fact 1(26.

94

Fact f26.

95

Fact f25.

96

Fact 131.

97

Fact 131.
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corrected her remarks of December 1991 stating that Petitioner's
back and neck problems could have been the result of any number
of causes including the normal agency process.98

She further

indicated that she could not state with any medical certainty
that the February 13, 1988 accident caused Petitioner's back and
neck problems." Dr. Anden concluded that it was unlikely the
small focal compression was caused by the accident.100
Dr. Anden testified at the hearing before the ALJ and
without hesitation, reaffirmed her opinion that it is unlikely
the lumbar vertebral compression fracture was sustained in the
fall on February 13, 1988.101
Dr. Roger Stuart, on examination of the medical files,
reached the same conclusion as Dr. Anden.

In Dr. Stuart's

opinion, Petitioner's back and neck problems are typical of a
gradual and, at times, progressive nature of degenerative spinal
changes related to age, genetic predisposition and activities.
He concluded that "there is no evidence to support the assertion
that the fall played a pivotal or major role in developing the
diffuse degenerative changes . . . or in [Petitioner's] current
back pain problems."102

98

Fact 132.

"Id.
100

Fact 1(33.

101

Fact 1(35.

102

Fact 1(34.
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This Court, in Stokes v. Board of Review,103 held that:
Medical evidence is insufficient to prove industrial
causation of any injury if it is equally probable that
a non-industrial accident caused the condition.104
Accordingly, the ALJ, as affirmed by the Commission,
properly determined that there was no medical causation according
to Stokes v. Board of Review,105 because: (a) Petitioner
experienced no pain to his back or neck contemporaneous with the
accident or months thereafter, (b) a medical examination 6 months
after the accident showed no back injury, (c) he never mentioned
the accident to any medical care provider in four years, even
though he made several visits, until he believed that his health
insurance would not cover his back and neck problems; (d) the
opinions of Dr. Anden and Dr. Stewart agreed that it was unlikely
the accident caused his back and neck problems; and (e) it is
almost impossible to identify the cause of Petitioner's back and
neck problems with the lapse of four years.
Petitioner presented no medical evidence to prove, beyond
"mere possibility", that the accident on February 13, 1988 was
the medical cause of his back problems.

Findings of fact and

imposition of liability cannot properly be made on "mere
possibility".106

Substantial evidence clearly supports the

Commission's decision.
103

Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 1992).

104

Id. at 58.

105

Stokes v. Board of Review, supra.

106

Anderson v. Dominic Electric, 660 P.2d 241 (Utah 1983) .
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C.

Petitioner failed to marshal the evidence in support of

the findings and show that despite those facts, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.

Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
If appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion.107
This Court, in King v. Industrial Commission,108 stated
that:
. . . our procedural rules specifically require a
petitioner to provide a transcript of the proceedings
if he is going to challenge factual findings under
subsection 63-46b-16(4)(g) [of the UAPA]. A petitioner
must also provide a transcript if he argues a legal
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence in the case.
Otherwise, we have no basis on which to evaluate the
findings and conclusions.109
The Petitioner has not only failed to provide a transcript
on appeal,110 he resisted the City's efforts to compel
Petitioner to order and submit a transcript.111
In his efforts to "marshal the evidence" to challenge the
Commission's findings, Petitioner argues that Dr. Cory Anden, at
one time, stated that it is probable the lumbar injury was

107

Rule 11(e) (2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

108

King v. Industrial Commission, supra.

109

Id. at 34.

110

R. at 117-118.

1U

R. at 118-D, R. at 118-E.
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sustained in the fall.112

It is an undisputed fact, however,

that Dr. Anden corrected her initial statement based upon a
review of the Emergency Room records and learning that Petitione
did not feel pain in his back and neck at the time of the
accident or months thereafter.113

Dr. Anden ultimately

concluded that it is unlikely that the lumbar vertebral
compression fracture at L5 was sustained in the fall.
Dr. Anden later reaffirmed her opinion when she testified at
the hearing before the ALJ under oath and subject to crossexamination by Petitioner's counsel.

The Commission found Dr.

Anden's testimony to be credible, including her explanation as tc
the correction of her prior statement.

The Utah Supreme Court

has held that as an appellate court, "it has no power to
determine the weight of the evidence or credibility of the
witnesses."114

It is inherent within the prerogatives of the

Commission, as fact finder, to judge the credibility of witnesses
and draw any reasonable inferences.115
The Petitioner next argues that if he did not have a
degenerative condition, there is no other trauma, except the
fall, to account for his back problems.

There is, however,

nothing in the record to support Petitioner's statement that he

112

Petitioner's Brief at 6.

113

Fact H32.

114

Bicrfoot's Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 714 P.2d 1152
(Utah 1986) .
115

See, Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P.2d 44 (Utah 1966).
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did not have a degenerative condition.

On the contrary, the

record indicates that he has a degenerative condition.116
Further, there is nothing in the record which supports his
statement that no other trauma occurred.

UnLess Petitioner was

absolutely dormant during the four year period between the
accident and the time he notified the City, any number of
exertions could have caused his problems.
Petitioner further argues, without citing the record, that
the Commission required him to show that it was "highly likely"
his back problem resulted from his accident.117

There is,

however, nothing in the record to show that the Commission
applied a burden of proof other than a preponderance of the
evidence.

The Commission did state that the "mere possibility"

of medical causation is insufficient which is consistent with
this Court's decision in Stokes v. Board of Review.118
Petitioner apparently challenges the weight given to the
evidence by the Commission.

In an appellate review, however,

this Court:
. . . will not ordinarily weigh the evidence nor
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on
findings of fact or choices between conflicting
testimony or inferences . . . .119
Finally, Petitioner states that " . . . the City has already
116

Facts H1l9, 32 and 34.

^Petitioner's Brief at 7.
118

Stokes v. Board of Review, supra.

119

3 Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §80.21 (a)
(1992).
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conceded that it is equally probable that the claim of
[Petitioner] . . . is valid."120

As authority for the so-called

concession, Petitioner takes, out of context, a statement made by
the City in the argument part of a memorandum opposing
Petitioner's Motion for Review and then cites the statement as a
factual finding.

The referenced statement in the City's

memorandum paralleled the standard expressed by this Court in
Stokes v. Board of Review.121

The City was arguing that

minimally, the medical evidence demonstrated that it was equally
probable a non-industrial exertion caused petitioner's back and
neck problems.

It is an undisputed fact, however, that there is

no medical evidence, beyond "mere possibility", to demonstrate
medical causation.

If Petitioner is citing the City's argument

as a fact, then he should also accept, as a fact, the City's
argument that there is no medical causation between the February
13, 1988 accident and his back and neck problems.
Accordingly, Petitioner fails to marshal the evidence and
draw this Court's attention to any flaw in the evidence relied
upon by the Commission in reaching its decision.

120

Petitioner's Brief at 5 and 6.

121

Stokes v. Board of Review, supra.
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POINT II.
THE COMMISSION'S DISCRETIONARY DECISION NOT
TO REFER THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE TO A
MEDICAL PANEL WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY.
Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that
" . . . the Commission may refer the medical aspects of the case
to a medical panel appointed by the Commission."122

The

controlling statute provides for permissive referral.123

The

Commission, therefore, has an express grant of discretion not to
refer the medical aspects of a case to a medical panel.
Where a grant of discretion to an agency exists, " . . .
[this court] will not disturb the agency's interpretation or
application of the law unless its determination exceeds the

bounds of reasonableness and r a t i o n a l i t y . " 1 2 4
The Petitioner argues that the Commission erred by not
referring the case to a medical panel based on its interpretation
of Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated - the one year
statute of limitations.

The Commission, however, did not rely on

the statute of limitations in its decision not to refer the case
to a medical panel.

Rather, the Commission decided, within its

discretion, not to refer the case to a medical panel because
"there was no significant medical issue for the medical panel to

122

§35-l-77 of the Utah Code Ann. , emphasis added.

123

Workers/ Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission, 761
P.2d 572 (Utah App. 1988).
124

King v. Industrial Commission, supra at 35.
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determine. ,fl25
The Commission's exercise of its discretion did not exceed
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
There was no conflict in the medical evidence.

Dr. Anden

and Dr. Stuart concurred that it was unlikely the lumbar
vertebral compression fracture was sustained in the fall on
February 13, 1988. There is no evidence, beyond "mere
possibility", of medical causation between the accident on
February 13, 1988 and Petitioner's back and neck problems.

Not

only is there a lack of medical evidence demonstrating medical
causation, the facts show that Petitioner experienced no pain in
his back or neck at the time of the accident or for months
thereafter/126 the Emergency Room records show no injury to his
back or neck;127 he missed no work time as a result of the
accident/128 he never mentioned the accident to any of his
medical care providers for four years/129 four months after the
accident, Dr. Barlow found no back injury/ and Petitioner
notified the City for the first time of his back and neck
problems four years after the accident.
The Commission did not abuse its discretion by deciding not
to refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel.
125

Fact H36.

126

Fact 1{5.

127

Fact f7.

128

Fact K9.

129

Fact ff7, 16, 24.
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POINT III.
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION THAT PETITIONER'S
CLAIM WAS BARRED BY SECTION 35-1-99 OF THE
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. (1988) IS DISPOSITIVE OF
THIS CASE.
The Commission determined that Petitioner's claim was barred
by Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code Annotated (1988) because he
failed to notify the City of his alleged back and neck problems
within one year from the date of the accident.130 The
Petitioner notified the City of his alleged back and neck
problems approximately four years after the accident.131
The Petitioner only appealed " . . . that portion of the
[Commission's] Order which held that [Petitioner] . . . failed to
prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence."132

The

Commission's decision regarding the statute of limitations was
not raised as an issue by Petitioner in his docketing statement
or his initial appellate brief.133
Since Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
limits the material contained in reply briefs to "answering any
new matter set forth in opposing briefs", this Court will not
address the decision of the Commission regairding the statute of
limitations.

Accordingly, the Commission's decision that

Petitioner's claim was barred by the applicable statute of

130

Fact H36.

§35-1-99 of the Utah Code Ann. (1988).

131

Fact 126.

132

Fact f3 8.

133

R. at 112A-Y, Petitioner's Brief at 1.
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limitations is final and, without more, disposes of this
case.134
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons stated herein, the City respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the Commission's decision denying
Petitioner worker's compensation for his back and neck problems<
DATED this

/3

day of

IjtuU

, 1993.

FRANK M. NAKAMURA
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent

134

It should be noted that the purpose of the one year
statute of limitations is particularly applicable in this case.
As a result of the four year lapse of time, it is almost
impossible to identify the cause of the Petitioner's back and
neck problems. Unless Petitioner was absolutely dormant in the
last four years, the cause of his back and neck problems could
have resulted from any number of causes including the normal
aging process. Further, the medical evidence shows that it is
unlikely that the accident caused Petitioner's back and neck
problems because he did not feel any back or neck pain at the
time of the accident or months thereafter. If Petitioner had
felt pain in his back and neck at the time of the accident or
months thereafter, he likely would have reported the problems to
the City in a timely manner. The absence of back and neck pain
at the time of the accident or months thereafter was an important
factor, in the opinion of Dr. Anden and Dr. Stewart, that there
was no medical causation.
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tion, the burden of proof being on any person
seeking to establish the contrary; and
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing
that a partner of a partnership or an owner
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control
or responsibility for any failure to insure or
otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation may only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may
not be considered an employee under Subsection
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43(3)(b).
1992
35-1-43.

'"Employee," "worker" or "workmen,"
and "operative" defined — Mining les-

sees and sublessees — Partners and
sole proprietors — Corporate officers
and directors — Real estate agents and
brokers.
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workmen," and "operative" mean:

466

naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given.
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for
a real estate broker if:
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from
real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(c) the contract states that the real estate
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as
an employee for federal income tax purposes, lses
35-1-44. Definition of terms.
The following terms as used in this title shall be
construed as follows:
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the average weekly earnings arrived at by the rules
provided in Section 35-1-75.
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of
the commission as to the amount of compensation
due any injured, or the dependents of any deceased, employee.
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and
benefits provided for in this title.
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically impaired as to function. Disability can be total or
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or
nonindustrial.
(5) "General order" means an order applying
generally throughout the state to all persons, employments, or places of employment of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All other
orders of the commission shall be considered special orders.
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition
reflecting any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement or standard of the
commission, or any other determination arrived
at, or decision made, by the commission.
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment" includes
any injury caused by the willful act of a third
person directed against an employee because
of his employment
(b) The term does not include a disease,
except as the disease results from the injury.
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of employment, means the
freedom from danger to the life, health, or welfare of employees reasonably permitted by the
nature of the employment.

(a) each elective and appointive officer and
any other person, in the service of the state, or of
any county, city, town, or school district within
the state, serving the state, or any county, city,
town, or school district under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express
or implied, written or oral, including each officer
and employee of the state institutions of learning; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer,
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or
more workers or operatives regularly in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied,
oral or written, including aliens and minors,
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but
not including any person whose employment is
casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, or occupation of his employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of
mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may
elect to include as an employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve
written notice upon its insurance carrier and
upon the commission-naming the persons to be
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of
a sole proprietorship is _coiisidered__an_employee
under this_chapter until -this.Jioticejiaajjefin
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and
given. For premium rate making, -the-insurance
moral well-being.
iwi
earner shall assume the salary~or~ wage of the
employee to be^.150% of the state's average 35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents
weekly wage.
to be paid.
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
director or officer of the corporation as an eminjured and the dependents of each such employee
ployee under this chaDter. If a cnmnraH/m moL-A«

flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury or death, and such amount
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case o( death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical,
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on
the employee.
isss

tion restraining the further operation ot tne employer's business.
i989
35-1-46.10. Notice of noncompliance to employer — Enforcement power of commission — Penalty.
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe that
an employer of one or more employees is conducting
business without securing the payment of benefits in
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the
commission may give that employer written notice of
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known
address of the employer.
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the commission may issue an order requiring the employer to
appear before the commission and show cause why
the employer should not be ordered to comply with
the provisions of Section 35-1-46.
(3) If it is found that the employer has failed to
provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three
ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the commission
may order any employer to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46.
(4) The commission may also impose, at the time of
the hearing, a penalty against the employer of not
more than one and one-half times the amount of the
premium the employer would have paid for workers'
compensation insurance had that employer been insured by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
during the period of noncompliance.
(5) This penalty shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-107
and used for the purposes of that fund.
1967

35-1-46. Employers to secure workers' compensation benefits for employees —.
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunction — Violation.
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns,
and school districts, shall secure the payment of
workers' compensation benefits for their employees:
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay*
ment of this compensation with the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments
shall commence within 30 days after any final
award by the commission;
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final award by
the commission; or
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and
when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any
final award by the commission. In these cases the
commission may in its discretion require the de- 35-1-46.20. Requirements of any order of the
commission — Court enforcement
posit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to
Any order issued by the commission under authorsecure the payment of compensation liabilities as
they are incurred, and may at any time change or ity of Section 35-1-46.10 shall be in writing, shall be
modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if sent by registered mail to the last known address of
in its judgment this action is necessary or desir- the employer, and shall state the findings and order
able to secure or assure a strict compliance with of the commission. The order shall specify its effective
all the provisions of law relating to the payment date, which may be immediate or may be at a later
of compensation and the furnishing of medical, date. The order of the commission, upon application
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and bur- by the commission made on or after the effective date
ial expenses to injured employees and to the de- of the order to a court of general jurisdiction in any
pendents of killed employees. The commission county in this state, may be enforced by an order to
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privi- comply entered ex parte and without notice by the
court
1966
lege as a self-insurer.
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 3&»l-4&30. Employer's penalty for violation —
Notice of noncompliance — Proof reany employer, within the provisions of this chapter,
quired — Admissible evidence — Crimfrom further operation of the employer's business,
inal prosecution.
where the employer has failed to provide for the pay(1) Any employer who fails to comply, and every
ment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, officer of a corporation or association which fails to
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the comply, with the provisions of Section 35-1-46 is
employer's business until the payment of these bene- guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Each day's failure to
fits has been secured by the employer as required by comply is a separate offense. All funds, fines, or penthis section. The court may enjoin the employer with- alties collected or assessed shall be deposited in the
Uninstured Employers' Fund created by Section
out requiring bond from the commission.
(3) If the commission has reason to believe that an 35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that fund If the
employer of one or more employees is conducting a commission has sent written notice of noncompliance
business without securing the payment of compensa- by registered mail to the last known address of the
tion in one of the three ways provided in this section, employer, corporation, or officers of a corporation or
the commission may give such employer five days' association, and the employer, corporation, or officers
written notice by registered mail of such noncompli- do not within ten days provide to the commission
ance and if the employer within said period does not proof of compliance, the notice and failure to provide
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as proof constitutes prima facie evidence that the emprovided in this section and the court is empowered, ployer, corporation, or officers were in violation of
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunc- this section.

35-1-75
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35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of computation.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Hourly employees.
Minimum hours,
The fact that an employee voluntarily limited his work hours to 13 per week did not
make it unfair to award him compensation
benefits for 20 hours. If the Legislature had
intended to limit an hourly employee to the

actual number of hours he or she worked per
week in calculating the compensation rate, the
Legislature would not have included a statutory minimum of 20 hours in Subsection (l)(e).
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Workers' compensation: bonus as
factor in determining amount of compensation,
84 A.L.R.4th 1055.

35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical
panel.
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may
determine to be necessary or desirable.
Ob) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, pro62

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-77

longed, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death,
and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so
contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch- 57, § 1; 1969,
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41,
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted the
first "and" for "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and de-

leted the former second sentence, which read
"The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel under Section 35-2-56"; added Subsections (1Kb) and (c)
and redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as
(l)(d); and added the second sentence in Subsection (2Kb).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Referral to panel.

Effect of 1982 amendment
Referral to panel.
—Discretion.
Cited.
Effect of 1982 amendment
In accord with bound volume. See Ortiz v.
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah C t
App. 1989).
This section is procedural and may be applied to an accident that occurred prior to the
1982 amendments. Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n,
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Ct App. 1989).

— Discretion.
The court of appeals cannot say that the administrative law judge abused his discretion in
not referring the case to a medical panel when
there was medical evidence to support Ins find^ ^ f ^ p 0 * ^ ^
T- " S j ™ 1 C o m m n ' 7 6 1 R 2 d 5 7 2 ( U t a h C t
App
- 1988)Cited in Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n, 755
P.2d 166 (Utah C t App. 1988); USX Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 383 (Utah C t
App. 1989).
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
which the agency action is based, IB unconstitustatute governing the agency or, in the absence
tional on its face or as applied;
of such a venue provision, in the county where
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdicthe petitioner resides or maintains his principal
tion conferred by any statute;
place of business.
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
requiring resolution;
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
applied the law;
and shall include:
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro(i) the name and mailing address of the
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed
party seeking judicial review;
to follow prescribed procedure;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
respondent agency;
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
or were subject to disqualification;
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli(g) the agency action is based upon a determicate copy, summary, or brief description of
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency,
the agency action;
t h a t is not supported by substantial evidence
(iv) identification of the persons who were
when viewed in light of the whole record before
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedthe court;
ings that led to the agency action;
(h) the agency action is:
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the informal proceeding;
the agency by statute;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior pracjudicial review;
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
tency by giving facts and reasons that demtype and extent of relief requested;
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
consistency; or
petitioner is entitled to relief.
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 63-46b~17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
of Civil Procedure.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall detive proceedings by the district court or the retermine all questions of fact and law and any
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an apconstitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
pellate court, the court may award damages or
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicompensation only to the extent expressly authocial proceedings under this section.
1990
rized by statute.
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking mdieial revwuw k«» K~~- —i—«•—*-• ••

(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1987
63-46b-18.

Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies p e n d i n g final disposition.

(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the «mrf ™»«

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Form of report
The attending physician makes his report on
a pnnted blank furnished for that purpose in

35-1-99

which he describes the injury. Utah DelawareMining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187,
239 P. 94 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensauon § 266.

Key Numbers, — Workers' Compensation
** 979.

35-1-99. Notice of injury and claim for compensation —
Limitations of action.
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident in the
service of his employer fails to give written notice within 180 calendar days to
his employer or the commission of the time and place where the accident and
injury occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, the employee's
claim for benefits under this chapter is wholly barred. If, for amy reason, an
employee is himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's nextof-kin or attorney may file it within the required 180-day period. Receipt of
written notice is presumed if the employer complies with the terms of Section
35-1-97 by filing with the commission an accident report, or if the employer or
its insurance carrier pays disability or medical benefits to or on behalf of the
injured employee.
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's medical benefit
entitlement, except with respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier for payment,
for a period of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably related to
the industrial accident.
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed with the industrial commission within six years after the date
of the accident.
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the employee.
History: CX. 1917, J 3156s, added by L.
1921, ch. 67,1; &S. 1933,42-1-92; L. 1939, ch.
51, $ 1; C. 1943,42-1-92; L. 1981, ch. 287, § 6;
1988, ch. 211, § 11; 1988, ch. 118, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendmerit, effective July 1, 1986, in the first sentence, substituted "accident and injur/' for
"same", substituted "in the notice subjects" for
"therein shall subject* and made minor word
changes; made stylistic changes in the second
sentence; divided the former third sentence
into three sentences and made stylistic
changes therein; and, in the fourth sentence,
deleted "industrial commission and" before
employee" and made minor word changes.
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988,
designated the previously undesignated IanIttage as Subsection (1), added Subsections (2)
taough (4) and, in Subsection (1), substituted

the present second and third sentences for the
former last four sentences, relating to the same
subject matter, and, in the first sentence, deIeted the proviso clause at the end, relating to
knowledge being equivalent to notice and to
defect or inaccuracies in the notice, and, in the
remaining language, substituted "If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial
accident in the service of his employer fails to
give written notice within 180 calendar days to
his employer or the commiaaion" for "When an
employee claiming to have suffered an injury
in the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer" and "the employee's claim
for benefits under this chapter is wholly
barred" for "within 48 hours, when possible, or
mils to report for medical treatment within
that time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%."
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Dismissal by court.
Summary affirmance.
Time for
filing.
Clted
Dismissal by court
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah C t
App. 1987).
Summary affirmance.
Summary affirmance under this rule is a determination of the appeal on its merits, after
the parties have been afforded a full and adequate opportunity to present relevant argu-

ments and authorities. An appellate court's rejection of appellant's contentions as unmento^ous d o e s n o t d e n y ^
y^ right of appeal.
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
A p p 1 9 8 g ) . state v. Palmer, 786 P.2d 248
(Utah Ct App. 1990) (decided under former
Rule 10, Utah R. Ct. App.).
Time for filing.
A motion for summary disposition that is
clearly meritorious supports a suspension of
the time limitation contained in this rule.
B a i l e v A d a m s 7 9 8 R 2 d 1 1 4 2 ( U t a h Ct A
y '
- PP1990).
Cited in Benchmark, Inc. v. Salt Lake
Valley Mental Health Bd., Inc., 830 P.2d 218
(Utah 1991).

Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket sheet,
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified
by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for
the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under
paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. Immediately upon filing of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all of the original
papers and any transcript filed in that court in chronological order and shall
prepare a chronological index of those papers. The index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in the trial court and the
starting page of the record on which the paper will be found. Clerks of the
trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking
out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an
appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall
consist of the following.
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the
papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In
such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court,
simultaneously with the filing of appellant's reply brief, notice of the
date on which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial
court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief.
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers
are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the
trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs.
Only those designated papers and the following, to the extent appli-
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(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from
which the appeal is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of
law filed or delivered by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon
which the court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal.
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer
than 300 pages, the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate
court. Where all papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the
parties shall, within 10 days after briefing is completed, file with the
agency a joint or separate designation of those papers necessary to the
appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to the appellate court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of
the record or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All
parts of the record retained by the agency shall be considered part of the
record on review for all purposes.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice
*o appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and
the clerk of the appellate court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to
be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate
to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of
the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were
otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court transcriber
certified in accordance with the rule3 and procedures of the Judicial
Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as
the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by
the appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may
transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon
request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is
subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by these rules.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion* If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion,
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days
after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall,
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so noti-
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fied the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the
appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for payment of the cost of the transcript.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon
approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on
appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is
amended to make applicable in the Supreme
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for
preparing a transcript where the record is
maintained by an electronic recording device,
The rule is modified slightly from the former
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appeilant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsibility to arrange for the preparation of the
transcript.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment. effective October 1, 1992, added the second sentence in Subdivision (a) and made sty-

listic changes in the third sentence; in Subdivision (b) inserted "and any transcript" and substituted "a chronological index" for "an alphabetical index" in the first sentence and added
the third sentence; and in Subdivision (d) deleted "and Exhibits" from the heading, deleted
"original" before "papers" in four places, rewrote the introductory paragraph in Subdivision (2), deleting a second sentence similar to
the new third sentence in Subdivision (b), deleted "by the parties, as set forth in Rule
12(b)(2)" from the end of the first sentence in
Subdivision (2)(A), and added Subdivision <3).
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•emanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
W been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits
•ball also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10
jays after the response is filed.
*" (c) Order of the court Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
mated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties
or upon the court's motion.
> (e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the
fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial
court shall enter written findings of fact.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings
Wore the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon
tibe preparation of the entire record.
Jfg) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the
ial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule
fcr briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
ie during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
- -ewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
3(6e findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
•Mne standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
fjMded effective October 1, 1992.)

fcile 24. Briefs.
, (a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
•Ppropriate headings and in the order indicated:
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
ta inside the cover.
f
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula.
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
j
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with
the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further bneft
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g)References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered,
and received or rejected.
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form*
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions,findingsof
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fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document
subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief
must now contain for each issue raised on apptal, a statement of the applicable standard of
review and citation of supporting authority.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, added the
third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made stylistic changes m Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutional arguments.
Contents.
"-Argument.
^Inappropriate language.
—Issues raised.
-Statement of facts with citation to record.
*-—Failure to contain.
—Standard of review.
Failure to file.
—Defective appeal.
^Perty documented argument.
BfPty brief.
Cited.
Constitutional arguments.
In order to make an argument for an mnova*™e interpretation of a state constitutional
***itton textually similar to a federal provi-

sion, the following points should be developed
^PP01*60* ^^ authority and analysis.
First, counsel should offer analysis of the
unique context in which Utah's constitution
developed with regard to the issue at hand.
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state
appellate courts regularly interpret even
textually similar state constitutional provis ons i n a
^
manner different from federal mterpretations of the United States Constitution
and knat it i* entirely proper to do so in our
federal system. Third, citation should be made
to authority from other states supporting the
particular construction urged by counsel. State
v
* **»> 8 0 3 R 2 d 1 2 6 8 ( U t a h C t A P * 1990) *
Contents.
A brief must contain some support for each
contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960
and
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 92000214

JAMES TURCSANSKI,
FINDINGS OF FACT,

Applicant,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
*
*

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendants.

*

AND ORDER

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on July
20, 1992, at 3:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Robert
Breeze, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Frank Nakamura,
Attorney at Law.

This is a claim for medical expenses in connection with an
alleged industrial accident of February 13, 1988. No temporary
total disability or permanent partial impairment is claimed.
Defendants deny liability on the grounds that medical causation is
lacking, and further, that the statute of limitations bars this
claim.
Applicant made a preliminary Motion for Summary Judgment based
on the opinion of Dr. Corey Anden. Dr. Anden later changed her
opinion and the motion was withdrawn. Defendants made a Motion for
Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. That motion
was taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge.
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant, James Turcsanski, was €»mployed by Salt Lake
City Corporation's water department in 1988. On February 13, 1988,
he and another employee, Jeff Jensen, were assigned to clean the
ceiling of a pump house.
The applicant was working on a ladder approximately 10 to 12
feet off the floor, cleaning the ceiling overhead with a mop.
Jensen was initially holding the ladder, but when Turcsanski began
dripping on him, he moved. Shortly thereafter the ladder slipped
and fell. Turcsanski fell straight down in a backwards position,
and landed on his back with the ladder lying under him.
He
testified that the fall was somewhat like "riding the ladder" all
the way down, with the ladder underneath him. He put his hands
down to break his fall and injured his arm on a protruding valve.
Photo exhibits A-3, A-4, and A-5 represent photographic attempts by
Turcsanski to re-create the fall.
After the fall, the applicant got off the ladder and felt pain
in his right arm and leg. On cross-examination he specifically
denied feeling any back pain. He went to the Emergency Room at
Holy Cross Hospital. Their records indicate that he was treated
for a contusion on his right forearm.
(Ex. D-l, p. 6.)
He
returned to work and completed his shift. He has not missed any
time from work due to this injury.
During the next few years, Turcsanski was occasionally treated
by his family physician, Dr. King Udall, for a variety of general
medical problems. The records disclose a visit one month after the
fall in 1988 for stomach problems (Ex. D-l, p. 14) . On June 20,
1988, Turcsanski saw Dr. Udall complaining of pain in his back.
Dr. Udall's notes state "Has pain in his back. No temperature. No
back injury. Feels better today." He diagnosed prostatis and
prescribed medication, (Ex. D-l, p. 15.)
More than a year later, on November 20, 1989, Turcsanski saw
Dr. Udall complaining of several things, including neck pain and
depression. Dr. Udall characterized the depression as being "of
greater concern" and prescribed Prozac. (Ex. D-l, p. 13.) He also
ordered a cervical x-ray.
The x-ray report indicates "marked
degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc" between C5 and CS
and between C6 and C7. (Ex. D-l, p. 34).
On December 26, 1989, Dr. Udall saw him again and noted, "Mr.
Turcsanski has had acute pain in the mid back, mainly on the left
side. He has had this kind of problem in the past, usually with
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acute infection. His neck is somewhat better."
Dr. Udall prescribed muscle relaxants.

(Ex. D-l, p. 17.)

Other visits with Dr. Udall involved bronchitis, sinus
conditions, cholesterol, and depression. At no time do the records
indicate the applicant mentioning a 1988 fall or resultant back
pain.
On May 28, 1991, Dr. Udall saw him and noted, "Jim again has
had severe low back pain. He is still concerned about sexual
dysfunction.11
(Ex. D-l, p. 22.) Dr. Udall prescribed Anaprox
again. The last notes from Dr. Udall are dated December 3, 1991
and state, "no acute problems were noted." (Ex. D-l, p. 23).
In December, 1991, the applicant consulted Dr. Corey Anden, a
physiatrist. The circumstances of this medical treatment were in
dispute. Turcsanski testified that he had begun to wonder if he
had back problems as a result of his 1988 injury, and he called Dr.
Jim Antinori, who had originally treated him at the Holy Cross
Emergency Room. Dr. Antinori opined that a back problem could have
resulted from the fall and referred him to Dr. Anden. (Ex. A-2.)
The employer argues that Turcsanski began tying his back
condition in to the 1988 injury because he had been denied
insurance coverage for back treatment by his health carrier.
Turcsanski admitted that he was unable to get his health insurance
to cover his 1991 back problems because they were excluded under a
pre-existing conditions clause. He then contacted Reta Halford,
who handles workers' compensation claims for Salt Lake City, and
inquired about receiving workers' compensation medical expense
benefits for neck and back treatment. Halford denied the claim on
the basis that no neck or back injuries had been reported in
connection with the 1988 accident. (Ex. D-2.)
Dr. Anden saw the applicant on December 9, 1991. Her records
state that he reported developing neck pain and tenderness in about
1990. She further noted that he had been evaluated by Dr. Udall
and diagnosed with degenerative changes at that time. During her
visit, she describes his symptoms as, "persistent left-sided low
back pain," and adds, "He generally has increased low back pain
every winter since 1989." (Ex. D-l, p. 46.)
Dr. Anden recommended that the applicant have x-rays and
possibly, a CT scan. She saw him in follow-up on December 23,
1991, to evaluate the x-rays. Her report states, "post traumatic
changes of the L5 vertebral body with disk space narrowing at L4-5
most likely sustained in the industrial fall in 1988; possible left
L3-4 radiculopathy secondary to disk herniation; left gluteus
medius muscular strain." (Ex. D-l, p. 40.) She recommended a CT
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scan but it was not performed due to the denial of coverage by the
employer/carrier.
On July 7, 1992, Dr. Anden issued a letter changing her
previous opinion given in this case. That letter came about after
Dr. Anden was given the emergency room medical records by Salt Lake
City Corporation. She notes in that letter that her statement
relating the lumbar injury to the 1988 fall should be corrected:
"I feel that this was an incorrect statement on my part, in
that, if a traumatic vertebral compression fracture had been
sustained in that fall, he would have had complaints of back
pain at the time, not over one year later. A more correct
statement would have been that it is possible that the lumbar
injury was sustained in the fall, although it could have been
related to any prior or subsequent traumatic injury, as no
other lumbar x-rays had been obtained to determine the age of
the abnormality.11
Dr. Anden concluded the letter with the statement: "In fact,
it is unlikely that the lumbar vertebral compression fracture at L5
was sustained in the fall." (Ex. D-l, p. 38.)
Dr. Anden testified at the hearing and further explained her
change of opinion. She stated that when she saw the emergency room
medical records from the 1988 fall she learned that Turcsanski did
not complain of back pain at the time of the fall. She testified
that this absence of contemporaneous back pain was a critical
factor in her change of opinion. She further testified that she
would have expected Turcsanski's back to be "acutely painful" for
4-6 weeks after the fall — if, in fact, a compression fracture had
occurred.
Dr. Roger Stuart performed a medical file review at the
request of the defendants herein on July 9, 1992. His report
concluded that the applicant's history and x-rays are, "very
typical of the gradual and at times progressive nature of
degenerative spinal changes related to age, genetic predisposition
and activities. There is no documented cervical or lumbar pain at
or near the time of his February 13, 1988 fall. Thus there is no
evidence to support the assertion that the fall played a pivotal or
major role in developing the diffuse degenerative changes present
on Mr. Turcsanski's x-rays or in his current back pain problem."
(Ex. D-l, p. 36.)
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The applicant, James Turcsanski, did sustain a compensable
industrial accident when he fell from a ladder on February 1, 1988.
However, he has not proven any entitlement to further medical
benefits as a result of that accident. No evidence of temporary
total disability nor permanent partial disability is present in the
record.
First, the claim fails due to the application of the statute
of limitations, U.C.A. 35-1-99. A claim for a back injury was not
made by the applicant to his employer within a reasonable period
after the date of the accident. The version of the statute in
effect at the time of his February 13, 1988, fall read: "If no
notice of accident and injury is given to the employer within one
year from the date of the accident, the right to compensation shall,
be wholly barred.11 Although notice of the fall and an arm injury
was clearly given to the employer, notice of a back injury was not
given until December, 1991 — nearly four years later.
This
failure to notify the employer of an injury seriously prejudiced
their ability to evaluate and treat that injury.
Applicant argues that the language of the pre-1988 statute,
which provides for tolling of the statute of limitations until the
insurance company (employer) gives a written notice of denial,
should apply to preserve his claim. While it is true that the
insurance company did not give Turcsanski a written denial of
liability, it was because they had no way of knowing he would reappear four years later with a new claim for a back injury. The
employer had paid for the emergency room visit promptly and no
follow-up care or missed work had resulted in three years. They
had no reason to send a denial of further liability because no
further liability was being claimed, and therefore, any application
of that portion of the statute to these facts would be strained.
Beyond the statute of limitations questions, Turcsanski has
failed to sustain his burden of proving medical causation in
relation to the treatment of his back. The Administrative Law
Judge finds that medical causation is lacking due to 1) the absence
of back pain at the time of his 1988 fall, 2) the absence of missed
work at the time of the fall or thereafter, 3) the multi-year long
delay in applicant's attribution of the back pain to the fall, 4)
applicant's inconsistent reports of back pain to health care
providers while readily seeking treatment for other conditions, 5)
the inability of his physicians to state a causal relationship
between the 1988 fall and the back pain, 6) the documented presence
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of degenerative disc disease as an alternative cause of his pain,
and 7) the suggestion that one of applicant's motives in making
this claim was to obtain coverage through workers' compensation
insurance several years later because it was being denied him
through his private health insurance. In short, there is simply no
credible medical or factual evidence that the back pain is related
to the 1988 fall.
The applicant urged the Commission to send this matter to a
medical panel for yet another evaluation, based on the argument
that Drs. Anden, Antinori and Udall thought that medical causation
was "possibly" present. Such equivocations are not sufficient to
put the medical issue in dispute. It is not clear what information
Dr. Udall has concerning the 1988 fall, and Dr. Anden states it is
actually unlikely that there is a relationship/
Rather than rely on these doctors' recent speculative opinions
as to what might be "possible," the Administrative Law Judge has
examined the contemporaneous medical records from the 1988 fall and
subsequent visits. Because those records do not identify any
medical or factual link between the fall and back pain, and because
none of the doctors will go beyond the realm of "possibility," she
finds no significant medical issue to justify use of a medical
panel as required by Commission Rule. This decision is consistent
with the language of the statute, U.C.A. 35-L-77, which clearly
places referral to a Medical Panel within the discretion of the
Commission.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of James Turcsanski for
further medical benefits in connection with his February 13, 1988
industrial accident is denied, and the same is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY
JAMES TURCSANSKI,
Applicant,
vs.

UT 84114-6600

*
*
*

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

k

it

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

*
*

Case No. 92000214

*

Respondent.

*

***************•****#*********•**

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to ut ih
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12
The applicant asks us to review the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order of the administrative law judge (ALJ1
dated August 27, 1992.
The applicant alleges 1 he tallowing factual errors:
1

The applicant requested permanent total disability
benefits once his condition had stabilized sufficiently, and the ALJ incorrectly said that the an
plicant did not claim these benefits.

2.

The ALJ failed to reflect the testimony of Jeff Jansen to the effect that the fall was of such a severity that he thought Mr. Turcsanski was dead.

),

The ALJ said that the applicant went to see Dr. Udall
on June 20, 1988 complaining of back pain when the
applicant actually had gone to see Dr. Barlow.

4

The ALJ incorrectly stated that there was evidence to
the effect that the applicant could not get his group
health insurer to cover the back problem.

5. The ALJ made no reference to the city attorney going
ex parte to visit Dr. Anden's office to discuss the
applicant's case on July 7, 199 2 without the
applicant's or his counsel's consent.
The applicant further alleges the following legal objections:
1.

There is no requirement in the pre July 1, 1988
version of the workers' compensation statute of
limitations that all physical maladies resulting from
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the accident be reported within one year.
2. The ALJ erred when she determined that the applicant
did not meet his burden of proof with respect to the
issue of medical causation.
The applicant requests that we reverse the decision of the
ALJ, or in the alternative, requests that we order the matter
referred to a medical panel.
A brief review of the facts will be set forth. On February
13, 1988, the applicant and another employee were employed by the
Salt Lake City Corporation, and were cleaning the ceiling of a pump
house. The applicant was on a ladder 10 to 12 feet from the floor.
The ladder slipped, and the applicant fell straight down, but
backwards. He landed on his back with the ladder beneath him. He
put his hands down to break his fall, and he injured his arm on a
protrusion.
After the fall, the applicant felt pain in his right leg and
arm. He went to the emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital where he
was treated for a contusion to his right forearm. He returned to
work to complete his shift, and did not miss any work time due to
injury.
During the next several years, the applicant was treated for
a variety of general medical conditions.
With regard to the
problems for which he claims workers7 compensation, he was treated
on June 20, 1988 by Dr. Barlow for pain his back. The doctor
determined that there was no back injury, and diagnosed prostatis.
On November 20, 1989, the applicant saw Dr. Udall for neck
pain and depression. An x-ray was taken which indicated "marked
degenerative changes of the intervertebral disc" between C5 and C6
and between C6 and C7.
On December 26, 1989, the applicant was treated by Dr. Udall
for acute pain on the left side in the mid back. The doctor
prescribed muscle relaxants.
On May 28, 1991, among other problems, Dr. Udall treated the
applicant for low back pain. On December 3, 1991, Dr. Udall stated
that there were "no acute problems ... noted.*
With regard to the next treatment on December 9, 1991, there
was a dispute between the parties as to the circumstances of
treatment. Dr. Anden saw the applicant on this date, and related
that the applicant began developing neck tenderness and pain around
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1990. Her records note that the applicant had been evaluated by
Dr. Udall who noted degenerative changes. Dr. Anden stated the
applicant's symptoms to be "persistent left-sided low back pain , , ,
[which] has increased ... every winter since 1989." She prescribed
x-rays and, possibly, a CT scan.
She reviewed the x-rays on
December 23, 199 2, and stated that there were "post traumatic
changes of the L5 vertebral body with disk space narrowing at L4-5
most likely sustained in the industrial fall in 1988[;] ...
possible left L3-4 radiculopathy secondary to disk herniation[;]
... [and] left gluteus medius muscular strain,"
The applicant testified that he went to see Dr. Anden based on
a recommendation from the physician who originally treated the
applicant at the emergency room.
Based on the applicant's
suspician that his current back problems were related to the 1988
fall, he had called the emergency room physician who felt that a
back problem could have resulted from the fall.
The employer, however, alleged that the applicant could not
jet coverage for back treatment by his health insurance carrier due
t o a pre-existing condition exclusion, and consequently attempted
to obtain coverage under workers' compensation. The applicant
claims that he did not bother to file with his health insurance
provider because of the exclusion. In any event, the employer
denied the applicant's claim based on the applicant's failure to
report any neck or back injuries in connection with the 1988
accident.
til', Anden changed her previous opinion as to the likely cause
oi the injury on July 7, 1992. Apparently, she was given the
emergency room medical records, and after review, she issued a
letter in essence retracting her previous opinion, concluding that
it was unlikely that the lumbar vertebral compression fracture at
L5 was sustained in the fall.
Further, she testified at the
hearing to explain her change of opinion. She testified that the
absence of contemporaneous back pain at the time of the fall was a
critical factor in changing her view, and that she would have
expected the applicant's back to be acutely painful for 4-6 weeks
subsequent to the fall if a compression fracture had occurred.
Finally, a medical file review by Dr. Stuart on behalf of the
defendants on July 9, 1992 yielded a report showing that the
changes to the applicant's spine were degenerative changes related
to age, genetic predisposition, and activites.
The doctor
concluded that there was no evidence to suppoort the assertion that
the fall played a major role in developing the degenerative changes
present in the x-rays or In the applicant's current back problems.
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The ALJ determined that the applicant did sustain a
compensable industrial accident on February 1, 1988, but that he
did not prove any entitlement to further medical benefits as a
result of that accident. Further, she concluded that the applicant
had not proved medical causation of his back problems due to:
1.

the absence of back pain at the time of his 1988
fall;

2.

the absence of missed work at the time of the fall
or thereafter;

3. the multi-year long delay in applicant's attribution
of the back pain to the fall;
4. the applicant's inconsistent reports of back pain to
health care providers while readily seeking treatment
for other conditions;
5. the inability of his physicians to state a causal relationship between the 1988 fall and the back pain;
6. the documented presence of degenerative disc disease
as an alternative cause of his pain, and,
7.

the suggestion that one of the applicant's motives
in making this claim was to obtain coverage through
workers' compensation insurance several years later
because it was being denied him through his private
health insurance.

Order, ALJ dated August 27, 1992 at 5-6.
The ALJ also decided that the failure of the employee to
provide notice to the employer of accident and injury within one
year from the date of the accident barred the applicant from any
compensation. The applicant did not give notice of the alleged
back injury until December 1991, four years after the accident.
This reliance on the statute of limitations to bar the applicant
from recovery was an additional reason to the lack of medical
causation.
We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the file to
support the ALJ's decision when the entire record is considered.
There aure some minor errors which are harmless, and do not affect
the outcome of this case. These errors do not affect the impact of
the statute of limitations, or the applicant's failure to show
medical causation. We will correct these errors since the
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respondent concurs.
The doctor who treated the applicant on June 20, 1988 was Dr ,
Barlow rather than Dr. Udall. The error in naming the physician
was harmless. We will also determine that the applicant asked for
permanent partial impairment, but this determination does not
affect the outcome based on the failure of the applicant to adhere
to the statute of limitations or to show medical causation. We do
not view the alleged failure of the ALJ to include in her opinion
that Jeff Jensen thought the applicant to be dead after the
applicant fell to be significant especially since the applicant
returned to work, and missed no work as a result of the accident.
The alleged error relating to the "strong arm tactics11 in
interviewing the respondents witness is not supported by the
evidence, and we deem it to be without merit, Another fact which
the applicant felt that the ALJ should reflect in her opinion was
that Dr. Anden was affiliated with a clinic which is a contract
provider for the city. Even if the ALT had not considered this
fact, the evidence is overwhelming that the applicant did not meet
his burden of showing medical causation. Even if such was error,
it was harmless under the circumstances.
With regard to the alleged error as to whether the applicant
had been denied health insurance coverage or had merely believed
that his policy of coverage would deny him health insurance
coverage, we find that the net effect of either is the same, acting
as if he had no health insurance for this problem. However, this
belief of the applicant was only one small factor in the overall
equation of this case, and standing alone is not determinative of
the outcome. There was enough evidence to support the findings of
the ALJ in this determination.
We also determine that the ALJ was correct in her refusal to
send this case to a medical panel, Referral to a medical panel is
within the discretion of the ALJ in this case. U.C.A. Section 351-77. There was no significant medical issue for the medical panel
to determine. The strongest term used by the doctors which could
support a medical panel was a "possible" medical causation* The
records do not identify any medical or factual link between the
fall and the back pain.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated August 27, is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
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Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

